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This is a positive study with theoretical and empirical aspects of the impact of
the Maastricht Treaty's (1991) convergence conditiona. The study is carried out
in a dynamic game context. Starting trom the Treaty, we compare four poasible
scenarios: a noncooperative scenarió, a cooperative acenario, a noncooperative con-
vergence scenario and cooperative convergence scenario. In theae laat two acenasios,
the EU-Member States pursue a restricted policy. Thia restriction is impGed by the
convergence criteria. The dynamic game analysis ia undertaken with an eatimated
multi-rountry model of the USA, Japan and eight EU-economiea.
Our ompirical results sn~est that coordination is a necessary condition for conver-
gence aud that coordiuation is wore profitable for the larger (leading and more inter-
dependent) economies, such as Germany and F~ance, than for the smaller (following
and more dependent) economies, such as Selgium, Denmark and the Netherlanda.
'This research was eponaored by the Economica R.eAearch Foundation, which ia part otthe Netherlande
Organization for Scientific íteaearch (NWO).
t We would like to thank Lana Bovenberg for valuable suggeatione on earlier drafts o[ thia paper.
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1 Introduction
Since the Maastricht 'I'reaty (1991), there is a lot of debate on the agreed convergence
conditiona. The Treaty sets out four quantified convergence criteria, (1) (low) inflation
performance, (2) fiscal consolidation, (3) interest rate stability, and (4) perfect exchange
rate stability. For each Member State of the European Union (EU) it is a necessary con-
dition to fulfil these four criteria in order to progress to Stage Three of the EMU by 1999.
In order to design a reliable macroeconomic policy for a`home' country, this country has
to take into account influences of as well domestic as foreign economic activity. It is cleaz
that during Stage Two, countries will only consider policies which aze austainable through
time, i.e., Member States will only pursue policies which satisfy the four mentioned criteria
in nominal values, provided these policies also lead to a reasonable macroeconomic per-
formance in other real variables such as GDP growth, employment or unemployment (see,
e.g., Crockett [5]). Since all EU-economies can be considered as open economies, there
exiat atrong interdependent economic relationships among these economies. Furthermore,
the increasing integration process will strengthen even more the economic interdependence
between countries in the future, which will increase the importance of cross-border effects.
Since the criteria indicate that each Member State has to follow the intereat rates and
the inflation ratea set by other countries, it ia likely that this `convergence constraint' also
influences economic policymaking of the EU-economies. We want to study the impact on
EU-policymaking if Member States are constrained by conditions, in this case the conver-
gence conditiona, set out by a supranational authority as the European Commission. We
will investigate the economic consequences for the EU-Member States for the short and
medium term, i.e. for Stage Two of EMU. It is argued by many authors that in order to
reach Stage Three, various costs are involved (see, e.g., Bean ['2], Brandsma and Italianer
[3], Buiter et al. [4] and Crockett [5]). For instance, the criteria emphasise a low inflation
rate and a sound public finance for the EU-Member States, but it may well be that this
hampera real welfare improvements like high GDP-growth or low unemployment in the
ehort and~or mediunr term. Furthermore there is the argument in the literature, that the
loss of freely using the exchange rate as a weapon of macmeconomic management may be
costly (see, e.g., Feldstein [12]).
We will study these aapects in a dynamic game context. For example, consider a EU
where the Member States fully cooperate. In that case any restriction, thus also the re-
striction implied by the convergence conditions, will decrease total welfare. In that case it
is, Lherefore, reasooable to search for a tneasure of Lhe costs of convergence for each country
separately and for the EU as a whole. On the other hand, if we assume that within the
EU Member States do not fully cooperate, i.e., if we are willing to consider a situation
where EU-Member States agree on shared policy targets but do not necessarily cooperate
in order to achieve these targets, then it is not straightforward that the imposition of the
convergence conditions will always lead to a lower total welfare. In that case it may well be
possible that the direction of the spillover effects are influenced in such a way that, through
the imposition of the convergence conditions, the size of negative spillover effects decreases.1 INTROU l 1("1'ION 3
If that is the case, then the convergence restriction may not only be beneficial for total
welfare in tlte EU but it may also be beneficial for each Member State independently in
the short to mediutn term.
In this paper we tnodel Lhe irnpact oi thc convergence conditions as a restriction on each
country's policymaking. In a cooperative acenario we conaider the full coordination out-
come and the outcome where the GU-Mernber Statc~s play cooperatively, but are restricted
by the convergence criteria. We will investigate how much convergence is possible~desirable
and what are the economic consequences for each Member State. For the noncooperative
case we will check whether the imposition of the convergence conditions are profitable or
not. As starting point we will return to the Maastricht Treaty (1991) and conaider four
types of hypothetical scenarios:
(1) Despite of the Maastricht Treaty therc is no agreement reached among the EU-Member
States: this is represented by a nottcooperative scenario (feedback Nash solution).
(2) No agreement reached as in (1), but now each Member State is additionally constrained
by the convergence criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty (`noncooperative convergence
solution').
(3) There is an agreement reached about full coordination: this is represented by a purely
cooperative scenario (Nash bargaining solution).
{4) An agreement reached as in (3), but there is an additional constraint imposed by the
convergence criteria (`cooperative convergence solution').
In this paper we compute these four (extreme) scenarios fot the SLIM-ntodel as described
in Douven and Plasmans [7].
ln the literature, there is a lot of intellectual debate about the conseyuencea of the con-
vergence conditions (see, e.g., Beau [2], Crockett [5] and Eichengreen [10]). However, an
empirical dynamic game analysis o[ the conseyucncea of the convergence conditions for
the EU-economies during Stagc Two is not made before. We are aware of one aimulation
study by Brandsma and Italianc~r [3] using the European Commission's Quest model. In
that study the convergence criteria are considered aa an example of agreement on shared
policy targets in the sense that the desired paths of the individual economies are jointly
finetuned and determined. They argue (see page 12): `Since it is diíficult to shoot at a
rnoviug target, the potentially best performers should make their targets explicit and also
make it clear that they will not try to push inflation much below that point of reference,
even when in[lationary pressure~s are weakening abroad'. Therefore, the pointa of reference
[or the inllation ratc and thc loug tertn interest rate are fixed beforehand in their analysis.
It may be clear that, in a dynamic context, the reference points may change during Stage
Two. For instauce, if there is an upward swing of GUP-growth in all ELJ-countries it is
likely that inflation rates, aucl, houce, also the refcrence points, will increase too. In that
nwpect, thi, c~mpirii-al aualysrs in Lhis papcr can bc see~n as an extenaion of the atudy of
Ilrandsma aucl Italianer [3], siua,, by coustructiug a couvergence function, we take the
possibility of a tnoving target into account. As we will show, the distinction between a
convergence function and individual welfate [unctions yields various additional advantages2 THE SLIM-MODEL 4
since we are now able to atudy the following aspects:
(1) How will the reference points of the nominal long term interest rate and the consumer
price inflation evolve over time?
(2) How much convergence is possible~desirable and how will the convergence aspects af-
fect welfare in the ahort and medium run as well for real as for nominal variablea in each
Member State?
(3) Which Member States are able to fulfil the criteria, a.nd which not?
(4) Are the convergence criteria, as aet out in the Maastricht Treaty, reasonably specified
or aze (minor) revisions necessary? i
In section 2 we will first recall some key properties of the SLIM-model. In section 3 we
will present a description about the four possible game outcomes where we will put most
emphasis on the convergence solutions, since the ideas behind this concept aze new in the
international policy coordination literature. In section 4 we will stazt our empirical work
and present objective functions for each country and a convergence function. We will spec-
ify desired paths and penalty weights for these functions. In section 5 we will present and
analyse the outcomes of our experiment and in section 6 we will conclude.
2 The SLIM-model
As noted in the introduction we use SLIM (Small Linear Interdependent Model) to perform
our dynamic game analyses. For an extensive description of the model we refer to Douven
and Plasmans [7]; here we will briefly recall some key properties of the model. The model
is designed on the basis of the Mundell-Fleming theory and contains eight EU-Member
States, i.e., Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, United Kingdom and the
Netherlands and two countries outside the EU, USA and Japan, which can be considered
as the two most important EU-trading partners. The model is estimated with annual data
for the sample period 1960-1991. In the SLIM-model, each country is represented by six be-
havioural equations wliicli contain strong interactiona. In table 1 we summarise how these
interdependencies are tnodelled. For example the dot in the upper row of Germany belong-
ing to the column of France indicates that Germany directly depends on ~ance. Thus, in
the SLIM-model the large EU-countries such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom
are strongly mutually interdependent, whereas open economies as Belgium, Denmazk, Ire-
land, Italy and the Netherlands are unilaterally affected by the larger EU-economies (i.e.,
there is no feedback transmission from the smaller EU-economies to the larger economies).
The model is alao designed such that all EU-economies are directly (or indirectly) inter-
dependent with the USA and Japan. To illustrate the behaviour of the model we briefly
~The empirical results o( Brandsma and [talianer [3] imply that if the Member Statee play a purely
cooperative etrategy, almost all EU-countriee will be able to fulfil the criteria. It is, however, important
to note that in this research the suthora use the wage rate as instrumental variable and they allow for
dismissing (government) employees.2 THE SLIM-MODEL 5
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Table I: Direct Interdependencies among the countries in the SLIM-model
state in table 2 the general form of the six behavioural equations. Equation (1) expresses














RL - I(I~L', RS, OP~)
a. A variables are in ogaritmic form, except RS, ~ZI, and U w ic are in rates. 0 in 'cates
`first differences' and the superscript ' denotes foreign variables.
that real output, Y, depends positively on the real exchange rate, E f Yy - Py, negatively
on the real long term iuterest rate, ItL - OPV, positively on foreign output, Y', and real
government expenditure G. lu eyuation (2) tlre output price, PY, depends positively on
nominal wages, W, inrport prices, E-F Pv, and deviations from trend output, Y- Y. In
equation (3) consumer prices, I~, depend positively on domestic output prices and foreign
output prices f; f PN . I,abour demaud in equation (4) depends negatively upon real wages,
W- I'y, positivc,Jy on rcal output and on thc, gap betwecn domestic and foreign pricea,
!; ~ P~ - I'v. 'I'Irc~ irnpact of the gap between Foreign and domestic output prices in this
labour dc,inaud equatiou is aiubiguous and depends upon the cormtry under consideration.'l '!'HE SLIM-MODIsL g
Nominal wages in eyuation (5) depend positively on consumer prices, negatively on the
change in unemployment, ~(L - N), and positively on labour pmductivity, Y- N. The
nominal long term interest rate, RL, in equation (6) depends positively on the foreign
nominal long term interest rate, RL', and the domestic nominal short term interest rate,
RS, and consumer price inflation, OP~.
Since unemployment is defined as the labour force minus employment, the model contains,
for each country, four exogenous variables, G, government expenditure, RS, the short term
interest rate, E, the nominal exchange rate, and L, the labour force. The model is designed
for short and medium term projections. One important aspect of the model is that, in the
ahort run, it produces stronger spill-over effects than related large-scale models like Quest,
Interlink etc. For example, the quantitative size of a global positive GDP output shock in
one of the major EU-economies has, in the first year, a substantial effect on output of other
EU-economies and ranges (roughly) between 0-SOq GDP output of the country originat-
ing the shock. Small open economies, like Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands profit
most from such a locomotive policy of one of the larger EU-economiea. For the estimated
elasticities and a detailed analysis of the model we refer to Douven and Plasmana[7).
-i ae ae .w oz o os o.~ oe ae
nwus
Figure 1: Eigenvalues of Á in the imaginary plane.
The specifications of the model in table 2 are estimated using an error-correction approach.
After estimation the SLIM model can be described by the following aet of equations:
yi - Ao~Js -F Aiye-i f AzJ~-z f Bou~ -~ B~ui-1 t Bsu:-s -f Doexi -i- Dlexe-~ -1- Dzexi-z f Êe3 DESCRIPTION OF THE DYNAMIC GAME 7
where Ào, Àr, ÀZ, Bo, Br, B2, Do, l~r and Dz contain the estimated ccefficients and y rep-
resents the vector of endogenous variables, uc the vector of instrumental variables, exc
the vector oí exogenous variables arrd Ê: the vector of errors in the model. Next, theae
equations are transformed into state-space form (see, e.g., de Zeeuw [23]). This yields the
following set of equations:
xc}r - Àxc t Biic f zc
jc - Cxr.
In this standard discrete time state-space form, xc, represents the vector of state vaziablea
involving endogenous and instrumental variables, yc, represents the vector of objective
variables for all policymakers, uc, the vector of instrumental variables for all policymakers
and zc the vector o[ exogenous variables at tiine l, C is specified such tltat the objectives
in yc are, for each country, GDP-growth, GDP-inflation, consumer price inflation, growth
in wages, growth in employmerrt and the nominal long term interest rate. In this study
we consider two sets of instrumental (policy) variablea for uc. In our first dynamic game
experiment we just consider the nominal short term interest rate and government expen-
diture as instrumental variables, whereas in the second experiment we also include the
exchange rate as instrumental (policy) variable. To get an idea of the size of the model,
A is a 180x180 matrix, B is a 20x180 matrix or 30x180 matrix depending on the set of
iustrumeutal variables used and C is a 60x180 matrix. In a discrete time-model, as used
here, the stability properties of the model can be easily checked by an eigenvalue plot. This
plot is shown in figure 1, where the eigenvalues oí A and the unit circle are plotted. If the
eigenvalues of fl lie inside the unit circle then the model is said to be stable. As we can
see, some of the eigenvalues fall on the unit circle in (1,0), and hence at least one equation
contains a unit root. These eyuations are, e.g., price equations. These equationa contain
a unit root in their level specifications but are stable in their first differences. This is,
however, not such a problem since in our dynamic game analyses we are mainly interested
in the first differences (growth valrres) of the various variables.
3 Description of the dynamic game
It is common use to compare noncooperative and cooperative outcomes when applying
dynamic game theory in economics. However, empirical studies with large scale mod-
els appear less often. One of the fitst well-known empirical studies is the Oudiz and
Sachs paper [20]; more recerrt studies are Ghosh aud Masson [14], Hughes Hallett [17] and
McKibbin and Sachs [18]. In this paper we compare two generally known dynamic game
equilibriurn concepts, the noncooperative feedback Na9h solution and a cooperative Pareto
solution, represented by the axionral,ic Nash bargaining outcome, with two other new con-
cepts in which Lhe players arc re~stricted in their policy choice. This restriction is imposed
by the convergence conditions, which can be interpreted as a dynamic conatraint on the3 DESCRIPTION OF THE DYNAMIC GAME 8
(non)cooperative game. We will now briefly explain the four solution concepts. Consider

















Figure 2: Scheme of the negotiation process of the Maastricht Treaty.
EU-Member States at the time of the Treaty. Each Member State enters the negotiation
process with a certain target or objective function, represented by J;,i- 1, ..., N. As is
common practice in dynamic game theory, we assume that this function can be approxi-
mated well by a quadratic functional':
z
J~ - ~y"(t)'Q~(t)y"(t) fu"(t)'~(t)u"(t), ~-~
(1)
where yA(t) :- y;(t) - yd(t) are the deviations of the values oí the target variables from
their desired values for each EU-Member State i at time t. Similarly, uA(t) :- u;(t) - u~(t)
is the vector of deviations of country i's instruments from their trend (desired) values. Fur-
thermore, the matrix Q; is assumed to be positive semi-definite and the matrix R; positive
definite for i- 1, ..., N. Now, each country i, i- 1, ..., N, enters the negotiation process
with its objective J; which has to be minimised eubject to a set of linear(ised) dynamic
constraints, represented by the SLIM-model as explained in section two. Furthermore, we
assume that the European Commission enters the negotiation process with as objective
criterion a quadratic functional on the convergence conditions of the Maastricht Treaty. It
is clear that we are now entering the field of dynamic game theory since each country's
behaviour is dependent on the other countries' behaviour. This can, of course, lead to
many possible outcomes; therefore, we will restrict ourselves to four (extreme) cases.
~Advantage~ and limitations of quadtatii Ioes functione are diacueeed, a.o., in Petit (21)3 DESCCtIPTION OF THE UYNAMIC GAML
3.1 case 1: Noncooperative policy
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Since there are no clearly established `rules of the game', we assume an environment where
each Member State has complete information and acts individually rationally. For an
appropriate description of a rroncooperative game outcome we use the feedback Nash equi-
librium. The feedback Nash equilibrium has sonre more desirable properties than other
Na.gh eyuilibria, such as strong time conaistency and stochastic robustness (see, e.g., Basar
and Olsder [1], de 7.eeuw and van der Ploeg (24] and Holly and Hughes Hallett (15] for a
comparisou of different Nash equilibria and for the mathematical expressions for computing
the feedback Nash outcome). Furthermore, the feedback Nash equilibrium is generically
unique in a linear quadratic franrework with a finite planning hotizon (see Basar and Olsder
(1]). We will follow a similar strategy here and use the feedback Nash equilibrium as the
threatpoint of the game. Thus, we assume that the EU-Member States play a noncoop-
erative game without taking the convergence conditions into conaideration. Remark that
this is perfectly acceptable in the two player case, but, since in our case there are more
players, we additionally assume that there will be no coalitiona among the playera 3. So,
here we assume that there is uo cooperation among countries at all. In the sequel we will
denote this outcorne by NC and the wclfare outcoure of this noncooperative solution by
JNC :- fJNC ,.. JN~}, where N represents the number of players (countries).
3.2 case 2: Cooperative policy
For the purely cooperative case we assume that the countries agree orr the Nash bargaining
outcome which is a Pareto optirnal outcome (see, e.g., Na.gh [19]). It is well-known that
this solution can be obtained by minirnising the `collective' loss function:
N N
J-~ aíJí, with a;10, ~ aí - 1,
í-1 í-r
(2)
subject to the linear constraints represented by the SLIM-model, and in which the set
{ar,...,aN} is chosen as aNH :- {aNH,...,aNH} which corresponds to the Nash bargaining
solution. 'I'his solution, which we will denote by NB, has some desirable properties. For
instance, there exists a unique relationship between the `welfare weights' a;~H, for i-
1, ..., N, th~~ disagreemcnt poiut, represe,nted by the noncooperative solution JN~ in case 1
and the welfare outcome of the Nash bargaining solution, say JNH -{J~ H, , JNH}4:
, , NH n;i ~ t7j(JNC- JNH)
a~ ~ ~~ 1 llí~j(J~C - .~~H)
30fcourse, it is poasible to take thie coalition aspect into account. However, regarding the fact that the
numberof coalitions between B EU-countries is already very large, we use here this aimplifying assumption.
4For a proofof this relationahip we refer to Douven and Engwerda [6].3 DESCRIYTION OF THE DYNAMIC GAME 10
This relationship implies that:
~iB(JN~ - JNB) - azB(Jz o - Jze) - ... - ~NB(JnNr~ - JnNiB) (3)
Since the deviations in the welfare functions are all described in percentage points, we
may assume that the welfare functions, J;, aze (roughly) compazable among countries,
i.e., if J; ~ J„ then we can azgue that policymaking for country i is more coatly than
for country j. This observation makes it possible to interprete relationship (3) as follows
(aee, e.g., Douven and Engwerda [8]): a player who gains mote from playing cooperatively
is more willing to accept a smaller `welfaze weight' than the player(s) who gain(s) less.
Alternatively, a player who gains less may demand a higher `welfare weight' by threatening
not to coordinate, knowing that the potential loss from no agreement ia lazger for the other
player(s). We will use this azgument for interpreting aome of our results.
The two previous cases are standard in dynamic economic game theory. In the following
two subsections we will elaborate the wncept which deals with the impact of the European
Commission. In this case we assume that the European Commission, as an independent
negotiation partner, is involved in the negotiation process as well. We assume that the
European Commission has its own objectives, i.e., the convergence criteria as specified
by the Maastricht Treaty, which can be quantified in a convergence function. We will
denotc this convergence function by C and assume that C is quadratic (like the individual
objective futictionals J;,i- 1, ..., N). The general form of this function is
N T
C - ~Cr, with C: - ~y~(t)~Q~(t)y~(t), (4)
where y~(t) :- y;(t) - y`(t) represents, for each country, the deviation of ita tazget vector
irom a reference vector at period t. Note that this `reference vector' y`(t) will not be
fixed beforehand for the complete planning period, but should at each time period t be
considered as a function of the target vectors yl(t),...,yN(t) and will be determined within
the optimisation procedure itself; C is defined as the sum of the individual countries'
convergence functions C;. In practice it is possible that each country has ita own reference
vector in mind to whicó it wants to converge in order to reach the convergence criteria but,
for practical reasons, we assume that countries cooperatively agree on the same reference
vector y`(t). The time dependent weight matrices Q;(t) contain the relative priorities
which each individual country wants to assign to certain convergence aspects. We refer to
Section 4 for these subjects and for a precise formulation of the convergence function and
do not elaborate these subjects further here. In that section we will also discuss the fact
that there may be some overlap between the countries' own objectives and the convergence
objective. In the sequel we first discuss the two convergence game outcomes.3 DESCRIPTION OF THIs llYNAMIC GAME 11
3.3 case 3: Cooperative convergence policy
The cooperative convergence outcome is modelled as a restricted cooperative outcome,
where the restriction is modclled with the convergence function C. Furthermore, we assume
that if one of the Gl1-Member Statea does not agree, none of the EU-Member States will
agree to play in a cooperative mode, in which case 1 is the appropriate model formulation,
i.e., we use NC of case 1 as the threatpoint oí the game. Another way to look at the
cooperative convergence outcome is that we are dealing with a game between N f 1 playera,
where the N cocmtries altogether agree with the convetgence criteria as specified by the
(N f l)st player. One could argue that, this (N f 1)st player, represented here by the
European Commission, has thc power to conduct the coordination process between the
N Member States and that a possible withdraw of one of the Membcr States from the
negotiation process would bc the starting point of a breaking down of the European Union,
i.e., will lead to case L Now we argue that there are not many incentives for one of the EU-
Member States Lo disagree with this convergence condition ab long as their corresponding
individual costs J;,i - 1,..., N, will bc lower thau the coats whicó are represented by the
noncooperative solution. Since all Ll~e EU-Member States are interested in the convergence
aspect (in order to reach Stage Thrce which involves the creation of a full cnonetary union
by 1999) we assume that they will try to converge as tnuch as possible as long as each




~ - Negotiation area
Figuce 3: The negotiation area in the Jt, Jp-plane íor the two player case.
example consider the two player case. The picture in figure 3 represents the Jl,Jz plane.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE DYNAMIC GAME 12
The convex Pareto curve represents all possible cooperative aolutions. The Nash bargaining
solution is denoted by NB and representa case 'l. The outcome denoted by NC is the
threatpoint and represents case 1. Remark now that all possible game outcomes outaide
the ahaded `negotiation area' are not interesting for at least one of the playera since, then,
at least one ia better off in case 1. In case 3 the EU-Member States are reatricted in
their policy choice by this `negotiation area'. The maximum convergence that can be
reached is a cooperative policy which staya inside the `negotiation azea' and maximiaes
convergence (i.e., minimiaes C). We denoted this outcome in the figure with CCO, which
repreaents case 3. [n Douven and Enwerda [6~ we showed that, in the N-dimenaional
case, all posaible cooperative convergence outcomes can be calculated by minimising an
augmented `collective' losa function:
N N
Jc - (1 - a) ~a;J; f aC, with ~a; - 1, OCa;,aGl,
~-i ~-i
(5)
aubject to a set of constraints represented by the SLIM-model in our case. Each coop-
erative convergence outcome can be represented by a pazticular set of {ai, ..., aN, a}. In
the aequel we will represent the CCO outcome, which maximiaea convergence within the
`negotiation area', by acco :- {acco~ aNCO ~cco}. In Douven and Engwerda [6J we
also proved that this CCO outcome ia uniquely determined, and that this outcome coin-
cides in the JI, ..., JN plane with the noncooperative outcome NC. Therefore, the dot in
figure 3, which liea on the corner of the `negotiation area', representa both; the NC and
the CCO outcome. Note, however, that the belonging policy choices of both outcomea
generally differ. In Appendix A we describe the formulae and the (constrained) numerical
optimisation algorithm for finding this cooperative convergence aolution CCO.
3.4 case 4: Noncooperative convergence policy
In this aubaection we assume that the EU-Member States pursue a noncooperative policy
which is restricted by the convergence criteria. We assume that each Member State i
minimiaes J;, with
J; -(1 - a;)J; f a;C; with C; asin(4),OCa;CI
and where J1; is the relative weight each player assigns to hia own convergence. For sim-
plicity, we assume that all players choose the same value for J1; :- a and we assume that
there is an agreement tl~at the Member States shoot on the same moving target y`(t). The
maiu di(ference with caye 3 is thaL cach individual country, say country i, trie~ to min-
imise its part, C;, o[ the total convergence function G' in a noncooperative game, instead
of minimising C cooperatively. Beforehand, it is hard to say whether this `cooperative
agreement' on y`(t) influences the individual welfaze functions J;, in comparison to the NC
outcome of case 1, positively or negatively. Furthermore, it is interesting to see whethera 1)fiSCltll''1'lON 0I' '1'(II? I)YNAMI(' (7AM1; I:I
this agreement on the same moving target y`(t) really will lead to convergence in a non-
cooperative world. In our empirical application we will actually investigate whether thia
outcome falls inside or outside the negotiatiou area as specified in figure 3. In the aequel,
we will represent this noncooperative convergence outcome by NCO and we willl denote ite
welfaze costs by JNCO :- { J~vco JNCO}. Remark that we aze interested in comparisona
of different outwmes in the Jl, ..., JN-plane and we specify the NCO outcome accordingly
S. To understand the impact of a constraint on a dynamic game more in general we discuse
J,
Jc
Higure 4: 'I'wo examples oí effects on inclividual welfare-loas originatiug írom a restriction.
graphically, in the two player ca.ge, what kind of properties an `ideal' constraint (imposed
by some kiitd of central authority) should posses. Remark, that in the following idea the
authority, which imposes the restriction, does not know beforehand what kind of game the
two players play. Consider again the Pareto curve P and the threatpoint NC in both dia-
grams of figure 4 and consider a possible restriction on the game. Since any restriction in
Lhe cooperative game leads to welfare loas in the J~, Jz-plane, we observe that in the coop-
erative restricted game the Pareto frontier P (in the Ji,Jz-plane) movea to the north-east
direction. [n the noncooperative garne it is, generally, unknown in which direction the NC
point moves. lt could move in any direction. As an example consider the two diagrama in
figure 4. In general, the first diagram ís an example of an `ideal' restriction; the restricted
Pareto frontier,P', lies close to the Pareto írontier, P, and the restricted noncooperative
point, NC', moves to the south-west direction of the NG-outcome. An example of a`bad'
restrictiou is visible in the second diagram of figure 4; the NC threatpoint and the Pareto
frontier move substantially to the north-east direction.
óAnother viewpoint would be to acale everything into the Ji...-. JN-plane, but thia yielde the additional
problem of the determination of a;.9 SPECIP'ICA'1'ION UI~ OL3JECTIVES AND Pft10RITIES 14
4 Specification of objectives and priorities
Since the dynamic game calculations with the SLIM-model are only relevant for the EU-
Member States, we exogenise USA and Japan in the model. In Appendix C.2 we will
describe the exogenous choices for these countries' exogenous variablea and for the other
exogenous variables in the model, such as the labour force. We will use for each country
the nominal short term interest rate and the level of government expenditure as policy
vaziables. For the other exogenous variable, the nominal exchange rate, the Maastricht
Treaty imposes perfect exchange rate atability at Stage Three. Therefore, we adopt two
approaches in this paper.
(1) Firstly, we fix the dollaz exchange rate on the 1991 level for the complete planning
period 1992-1999; in this case we assume a fixed (dollar) exchange rate regime.
(2) Secondly, we use the exchange rate as a policy variable wich receives a very high weight
in the welfare function. In this case we allow for small movements of the exchange rate
around the desired paths. Since in the SLIM-model each exchange rate within the EMS is
modelled through the dollar we consider small movementa azound the ideal paths of their
currency against the dollar. Hence, we have also tight exchange ratea within the EMS.
The motivation behind these two approaches is that we want to investigate the possible
gaina from exchange rate management as well in a cooperative as in a noncooperative
world.
It ia clear that in practice the monetazy authorities do not have the power to `fully' control
the exchange rate. Therefore, study (2) can be interpreted as a senaitivity analysis to
dynamic game study (1) and should give more insight into a question like: Is it possible to
improve convergence considerably if we allow for small movements in the exchange rate?e
For instance, the effect of exchange rate managenent in the noncooperative case is not clear,
since it may well be the case that a noncooperative use of exchange rate management may
lead to lower global and individual welfare for all Member States than in a situation where
exchange ratea aze fixed. R.emark, that in this research, we do not consider the posaibility
that monetary or fiscal policy could create tensions within the exchange rate system ~.
The choice of the desired patha yd(t) and ua(t) is mainly in line with previous studiea (see,
e.g., Hughes Hallett [16, 17)). We tazget growth values for Y, Py, P~, W, N, nominal level
values for RL, RS and real level values for G. The ideal target values for the growth rates
are constructed such that we start for each variable with a desired growth rate for 1992.
Tliese desired growth rates for 1992 were chosen such that they are in accordance with
the actual growth rates of 1991. Then, we constructed linear growth paths towards the
ideal growth rates for 1999. For the construction of the ideal paths of the level values
we used, in most cases, the true 1991 values (also representing the end of the estimation
period in the SLIM-model) as stazting values and applied lineaz interpolation towards the
1999 desired values. In subsection 4.1 we describe an individual objective function of each
BOther argumenta for uaing the exchange rate as inatrumental variable ate given by Petit (21~
~The caee where the exchange rate ie endogenoua is a aubject for future reaearch.4 SPECI!'IC,ATION O!' OBJECT'IVES AND PRIORITIES 15
Member State and in subsection 4.2 we specify our choice for the convergence funetion.
4.1 Individual objective functions and relative priorities
Tlre (growth) values for the ideal paths arrd their relative priorities aze given in table 3,
presenting each country's desired values for 1992 arrd 1999 respectively. The desired values
for the years inbetween are constructed by linear interpolation. Since we target level vari-
ables for real government cxpenditure, we specify for all countries the levels for the year
1991. We assume that each country, except Ireland, will aim for real output growth of 4qo
'L'able 3: 'I'he objective function specification (or the years 1992-1999. "
Countries
Belg. Denm. Germ. France IreL Italy Netherl. U.K.
The desir~ed values y; jor 1992 and 1999.
~Y 2.2-4.0 1.6-4.0 3.7-4.0 1.1-4.0 2.5-5.0 1.6-4.0 2.4-4.0 1.0-4.0
OPv 2.5-2.0 `1.4-2.0 3.8-2.0 2.8-2.0 1.5-2.0 6.6-3.0 2.8-2.0 5.8-2.0
OP~ 2.6-2.0 2.4-2.0 3.5-2.0 2.9-2.0 3.0-2.0 6.1-3.0 3.2-2.0 6.3-2.0
OW 6.0-5.0 3.9-5.0 4.6-5.0 4.5-5.0 5.7-6.0 8.2-?.0 4.4-5.0 7.9-7.0
ON 0.3-1.5 0.0-LCi 2.4-1.5 0.3-1.5 0.0-1.5 0.9-1.5 1.3-1.5 0.0-1.5
RL 9.U-7.0 9.1-7.5 8.2-G.0 9.'1-7.5 8.9-7.0 12.6-8.0 8.4-6.0 9.8-7.5
The desired values ud jor 1992 and 1999.
RS 8.9-6.0 9.5-7.0 8.7-5.0 9.3-7.0 9.5-7.0 11.4-7.0 8.8-5.0 10.9-8.0
~E 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0 0.0-0.0
~G 1.6-0.0 2.1-1.0 2.4-1.0 2.`L-1.0 1.6-1.0 1.4-0.0 3.7-1.0 1.7-1.0
Gr~r 15.073 14.076 13.073 15.043 1'1.360 9.340 13.545 12.611
The nelalivc priaritie.g (equal jor cach connlr7~)
Matrix Q Matriz R
DY ~Py OP~ OW ON RI, RS G E(ijincluded)
2.U 0.5 1.0 0.5 'l.0 0.5 2.0 2.0 10.0
". A units in percentage changes per annum, except Gr99r in ogazit ms.
and that Ireland aims for 5"1o by 1999. Lach country strives for a low GDP- and consumer
price inflation rate for which we assume `lolo as ideal in most countries in 1999 (only Italy
3~0). Due to the trade ofF between, on the one hand the inflation cost component and
on the ol.her hand t,he income component for the improvement~preservation of purchasing
power we Larget growth in uomiual wages around 5-7"lo for the ycar 19998. Due to the
eThe model conaiders private wages and therefore real labor income (real wages timea employment)
may grow slightly faster than GDP in 1999.4 SPECIFICATION OF OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES 16
above mentíoned trade off the relative priority of nominal wages is asaumed to be low (Q
value of 0.5). Growth in employment, one of the main concerns of policymakers today, is
given a relatively high priority of 2 and a desired growth path of 1.501o in 1999. Since at the
time of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 the nominal long term interest rates were rather high
in each country, we considered a decline of at least 2Qlo during the period 1992-1999 for this
variable. Note that at the Maastricht Treaty it is imposed that each Member State shou)d
strive for fiscal consolidation (before the end of this century, each country should have a
public budget deficit of less than 3010 of GDP and its governmental debt should not exceed
60 9'0 of GDP). Therefore, we assume that some countries restrict their level of government
expenditure substantially, e.g., for Belgium and Italy we assume a zero percentage growth
of the desired government expenditure in 1999. For the other countries we asaume an ideal
growth path of lqo in 1999.
The priorities policymakers attach to the different variables are reflected in the weights Q
and R of the individual objective functions. They are presented at the bottom of table
3. We assume that these weights are the same for each Member State and are conatant
over time9. For the desired paths yd we give a relatively high priority to GDP growth and
employment growth and relatively low priorities for the growth of nominal wages and the
level of the long term interest rate. Concerning the inflation rates, we give a higher priority
to the consumer price deflator than to the GDP-price deflator. For the desired patha ua
we choose a priority of 2, except for the case where the exchange rate is used as a policy
variable. In that situation we give a very high priority of 10 to the exchange rate (and
the other policy variables a value of 2), indicating that strong movements in the dollar
exchange rates are heavily penalised.
The choice of the desíred target values and weights needs some more explanation. At-
tempts in the literature, see for an overview, e.g., Frenkel, Goldstein and Masson [13),
to evaluate the gains írom policy coordination using empirical models led to the finding
that gaina are small. liowever, in the SLIM-model, where thcre are many countries and
stroiig interactions among the countries, we find that these gains depend strongly on the
number of countries and the relative weights attached to the target and the control part
of the objective functional. It is our experience that the distance betw~n the threatpoint
and the Pareto curve increases with the number of countries and decreases if one lowers
the relative weight of the control part (versus the target part) in the objective functional.
Furthermore, we find that the noncooperative outcomes are more sensitive to changes in
the deaired values and weight changes than the cooperative outcomes. This led to the
practical rule that we first conatructed a reasouable noncooperative solution, by choosing
appropriate weight values, and thereafter calculated the other three scenarios. Hence, the
researcher can experiment to some extent with the gains of policy coordination, and thua
also with the maximum degree oí convergence lo
9This is a aimplification. ln practice the relative priorities (and also the deaired patha) are (frequently)
ac(justed by the government.
1eThie clearly applies to almoat all control etudies in economics.4 SPECIFICATION OF 0I3.IEC'lIVES ANU PRIORITIES 17
One can decompose the convergence criteria in two typea of conditions (see Siebrand [22]).
On the one hand conditions which are conducted by the European Commission called
centrnl conditions and on the other hand decentrnl conditions which are executed by each
Member State individually. I~xarnplc~s of centralisecl policy behaviour are price stabilisation
and interest rate stabilisation; budgetary policy is an example of decentraliaed behaviour.
Since a restrictive budgetary policy seems to be sensible anyway, Maastricht Treaty or not,
we decided to put this decentral criterion in the individual objective functions and the cen-
tral criteria in the convergence function. 'I'he other distinctiorr which can be made here is
that the central conditions are au exampleoí shared fiexible policy targets, whereas the de-
central conditions aze an example of fixed policy targets. For instance, the reference values
for the individual budgets are fixed beforehand, whereas the reference pointa for the long
term interest rates and the inflation rates may fluctuate over time. This decision impliea
that we are comparing four dynamic game outcomes, all with a`cooperative agreement' on
fixed shared targets, which can be divided in two game outcomes (a uoncooperative and a
cooperative one) and two other game outcomes (a noncooperative and a cooperative one),
where the Member States additionally give some priority to the two central criteria which
are modelled as flexible shared targets.
4.2 The convergence function
Aa convergence fuuction we propose~ the following specification:
a 1-rr.x~
C-~ C;, with C; :- ~ b`{(RC(t) - RL(t))'t (OP~(t) - OP~(t))~}, (6)
~-1 1-1sss
where RL'(t) and OP~(t) are the long term interest rate and the consumer price deflator,
in year t for country i, respectively; the bar values represent averages of that year. We
rnake the (ollowing choice for these averages:
RI.(I) - ,~{IZLG`(i) f ÍtLF'(L)-F ftL11k'(t)},
OP~(t) - ;{OP~`(t) f OPF'(t) ~- ~P~r`(t)},
for each year t-1992,...,1999. l3y taking this particular choice we assurne that during the
planning period all EU-Mernbcr States follow the average level of the nominal long term
interest rates and the average consumer price inílation values of the three largest Member
States, Cermany, I'rance and the llnited Kingdom. Since the European Commission, (the
( N-~ 1)st. playor) acts as a represeutative of the N-players, we assume that the choice of
this particular convergencc towards the average of the `large 3' representa the agreement
betwern xll I?I1-Membor Statcs abont couvergence iu consumer price inflation and nominal
long tenu iuterc~st ratcwll. 'I'he parameter ó; rc~prc.~ents the time preference and~or a
11 Remark that wc have to make thia eimplifying aeaumption, since conalructing a convergence function
which accurxtely represents the convergence conditions of óhe Maastricht Treaty is very difHeult. Thia5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 1S
convergence weight for each country i. It seems reasonable to assume that convergence
becomes more deairable at the end of the planning period; therefore countries will put a
higher weight on convergence towards the end of the planning period. We simplicity we
asaume a constant b- 1.2 which reflecta the fact that the priority for convergence increases
by 2001o for each country each following year. R.emark that the final policy choices will be
sensitive for the chosen convergence function and note, furthermore, that the desired values
RL(t) and OP~(t) for each year t, t -1992,...,1999, aze not specified beforehand but will be
determined by the optimisation procedure, and, hence, by the convergence function itaelf.
5 Empirical Results
In this section we will describe the empirical reaults. In the firat subsection we will show
the reaults for the fixed echange rate regime. In the next subsection we perform the same
experiment but consider the case where (slight) adjuatmenta in the dollaz exchange rate
aze possible. Exchange rates are kept very tight which is modelled through the high weight
in the R-matrix. Therefore, if a particular country tries to adjuat its dollar exchange
rate it will be heavily penalised. In both dynamic game experiments we assume for the
NCO-outcome a- 0.2, indicating that each country gives a weight of 20q to minimise C;
and a weight of 8001o to minimise J;. We will study for this noncooperative outcome the
aensitivity of our results related to the choice of a and report aome resulta we obtained
with different choices for J~.
5.1 Empirical results in a Sxed exchange rate regime
Table 4 contains, for each country, the objective function values and the convergence valuea
for each game outcome. Since in our dynamic game analyses we minimise (convergence)
costa, we have that a low value for the objective function (convergence function) indicates
that there ia much welfare (convergence). As explained in section 3.3, we obaerve that
the objective function values J;, i - 1, ..., 8 aze the same for the NC and the CCO case.
Furthermore, we observe that in the N~solution each Member State has substantially
more welfaze than in both noncooperative solutions, NC and NCO. Also the NSsolution
yields a substantially higher degcee of convergence. This last aspect is remarkable since, in
the NCO-outcome, eacl~ individual Member State additionally attributea some additional
weight to minimise convergence, in contrary to the NBsolution. The experimenta, where
aspect, óowever, malces the dynamic game analyeea not lesa intereating, eince, in thie caee, it ie poesible to
look tor varioua convergence functione, which in fact could yield conditions which would be quite different
ftom thoee specified at the Maaetricht Tteaty. To go even a atep further, one could think of the paseibility
of conatructing an `optimal' convergence function. We refer to Appendix C for other apecifieationa of the
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Table 4: The objective function values, convergence value and weights in a fixed exchange
rate regime
Countries
Belgium Denmark Germ. France Ircland Italy Netherl. U.K.
NC 0.73 1.24 1.57 2.78 1.50 2.32 0.97 1.57
NCO 0.41 1.75 1.05 2.79 1.98 3.70 0.70 1.76
N B O.:f6 0.91 O.fi3 1.60 I.28 1.40 0.74 1.28







Bclgium Denmark Ccnn. l~rance Ircland ltaly Netherl. U.K. Conv.
a 0.13 O.15 0.05 0.04 0.'l`L 0.05 0.21 0.16 -
acco 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.19 0.31 0.14 0.42
we Lried di(fereut values for ~ in the NCO game, did not change this result very much. In
general, a higher a, and hence a higher weight on convergence in the NCU-solution yielded
more or hws thc samc rcwults with respfxt to thc dcgrce of convergcncc'~. Furthermore,
iu c:ompariwn to thc NlLsolution, thc CC(lsolutiou yiclds an additiuual degr~ of con-
vergencr.. 'I'hc~se obsc.rvatious give alreacly some eviclence to the fact tlrat coordination ia
a necessary requirement for convcrgeuce, or as stated by Brandsma and Italianer (3, page
11]:`...in tlre absence of proper coordination, a rnajority of the Member States would fail
to meet the convergence criteria, no matter how seriously they tried to converge'.
The next interesting queation is whether the couvergence conditions diminiah negative
spillovers in the noncooperative case. If we compare the two noncooperative outcomes, we
observe that welfare is higher in the NCO outcome for three countries (Belgium, Germany
and the Netherlands) and lower for thc other fivc countries (Denmark, Ftance, Ireland,
Italy and the U.K.). These results suggest that the convergence criteria in a noncoopera-
tive gamc increase total welfare for the three traditionally low inflationary countries and
decrease total welfare íor the five traditionally higher inflationary countries. If we again
consider figure 4 and translate the probletrr to the eight dimensional case, then we observe
that the couvergence constraint moves the NC' - NCO in the `right' direction for the
above mentioned three countrics and in the `wrong' direction for the other five countries.
If we rccall the interpretation of the aNB-weights in the NB-solutiou (see section 3.2), we
sc~e Lhat (;cnnany, h'rauce aud Italy havc a rathcr low wcight. llencc, thcse~ r.ountries gain
most if a purely cooperative strategy is adopted. '1'he relatively higher aNd-weights for Bel-
gium, Denmark, Ireland, the ILK. and the Netherlands may imply that these countries can
put heavy pressure on EU-negotiations, since their welfare gains from playing cooperatively
are less thau those for the other three economies. These outcomes suggest that most gains
come ftom cooperation between Germany and France. Internalising the spillover effects in
raChanging a from 0.2 to 0.6 yielded convergence values still higher than 8.05 EMYIItICAL RESULTS 20
a positive way seems therefore most profitable for these two interdependent countries. The
dependent country Italy profits most from this cooperation between Germany and France,
whereas all the other countries show only a slight increase in welfaze. The explanation
of the t~esult that Germany and France profit most is that in a noncooperative world the
additional costa Germany and France have to pay are for the greater part costa in terms of
instruments and for a lesser pazt costs in terms of tazgets. The externalities are, however,
only generated by the tazget variables and, therefore, the differences between the quanti-
tative effects in the cooperative NB-solution or noncooperative solutiona generated by the
lazger countries are relatively small for the dependent countries. This observation explains
also why small dependent countries like Belgium Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands
do not gain so much from a cooperative strategy 13. The intuition behind this reault for
the third interdependent country, the U.K., is that, in the SLIM-model, this country is
more dependent on the iJSA than on Germany and France. Traditionally the U.K. is more
isolated than tnost otlrer c;ountries in the EU which is reflected by the rather weak inter-
dependenciea with the other countries in the SLIM-model.
We now turn to the CCO-outcome. The results with respect to the chosen convergence
function seern quite good. First, this result suggests that if countries are wil6ng to coor-
dinate their policies, then a lot of convergence is possible. This observation follows from
the low convergence value and the high weight on convergence in the CCO solution. This
result suggests also that in figure 4, if we again translate the problem to the eight dimen-
sional case, that the Pareto curve P' tends to move alowly to the right if we increase .1. It
is possible to compare the `welfare weights' occo and aNB. The rule of thumb one can
apply here is: The Membcr States whose weights increase, from the NB to the CCO case,
contribute more to tlre minimisation of the convergence function than the Member States
whose weighta decrease. If we apply this rule of thumb, then we see that Italy contributes
very much to the minirnisation of the convergence function. This result is not surprising
since Italy is the country with the highest inftation rates and long term interest rates and,
thus, the C;, i-Italy, tcrm contributes a lot to the convergence function C. Applying again
the rule of thumb, we observe that Denmark, Ireland and the UK do not contribute very
much to tlre miuimisation of the. convergenc~ functiou. This result may imply that these
tlrree corintries face rnore welfare lose when trying to converge since their problems are
more structural, whereas the other five countries can already create a lot of convetgence
by `simply' internalising their externalities.
In order to discuss more country specific results we present in table 5, for each country,
the (average) target values and policy choices for the four different game outcomes over
the plannitrg period. Tlrc first observation is that optimal growth is found to be moderate
and that, except for Ireland, average growth is comparable to the average growth values
r~I'his result depends, ofcouree, atrongly on the aimplifying asaumption of the interdependenciea in the
SLIM-model in which Belgium and the Netherlanda are modelled as dependent economiea. If we would,
tor inatance, conaidet the total Benelux-economy, then the impact of thia economy on FYance and Germany
might be aubetantisl.5 I;MPlltl('nl, 2~SUL'I',S 21
Table 5: The average target- and instrumental values (1992-1999)"
Tai~et values
Bel. Germ. I)entn. France IJ.K. Irel. Italy Neth.
DY NL' 1.86 2.51 1.40 2.'l6 2.64 4.60 2.34 1.47
NCO 1.94 '2.5G 1.50 2.61 2.70 4.69 2.40 1.67
NB 1.85 2.46 1.53 'l. l`l 2.58 4.55 2.43 1.48
CCO 1.66 2.20 1.44 1.76 2.55 4.62 2.22 1.22
OPy NC 3.52 4.15 5.26 5.67 4.92 5.97 8.36 3.80
NCO 3.78 4.14 5.40 6.15 5.00 6.02 9.10 4.09
N B 3.01 3.76 4.94 4.28 4.55 5.74 7.32 3.37
CCO 2.92 3.70 4.70 3.92 4.37 5.62 6.08 3.30
0Pc NC 3.67 3.71 5.41 5.66 4.77 5.10 8.90 3.76
NCO 3.98 3.71 5.54 6.12 4.86 5.15 9.72 4.05
NB 2.90 3.40 5.06 4.30 4.40 4.82 7.71 3.21
('CO 2.75 3.3'l 4.82 3.95 4.23 4.70 6.38 3.11
~W NC 5.50 5.43 6.82 7.14 7.48 9.10 9.89 4.84
NCO 5.91 5.4G 7.06 7.82 7.60 9.18 10.74 5.32
N B 4.68 4.91 6.45 5.50 7.02 8.85 8.77 4.27
CCO 4.50 4.66 6.09 4.97 6.79 8.77 7.31 4.08
ON NC 0.01 0.35 0.36 0.33 -0.34 0.68 0.76 0.01
NC'O 0.02 0.39 0.38 0.50 -0.30 0.73 0.79 0.07
NB 0.03 0.52 0.44 0.'l4 -0.43 0.64 0.77 0.08
C'CO -O.Ofi 0.47 0.43 0.08 -0.52 0.64 0.69 -0.06
RL N C 7.9'l 6.97 9.fi0 10.34 8.72 8.93 11.80 8.02
NCO 8.36 7.1U 8.00 9.2'l 8.4'l 8.03 ]0.'l3 7.45
NB 8.49 S.lfi 9.42 10.34 9.5`l 8.95 11.49 8.18
CCO 8.85 8.91 9.54 9.96 9.66 9.48 10.86 8.71
lnstrumenlal values
Bel. Germ. Deum. France U.K. Irel. Italy Neth.
RS NC 6.59 4.71 8.39 9.71 8.`l7 8.95 11.27 6.78
NCO 7.33 4.91 6.44 8.03 7.G6 7.51 9.42 5.89
N 13 7A7 7.08 )i.40 9.9Fi 10.00 8.96 10.89 6.89
('('O il.l ï ~.(iï S.GIi !l.al 10.:30 9.67 10.08 7.89
G NC 15.099 14.149 1:3.IJ~i 15.1'l4 1'2.410 9.389 13.620 12.655
N('O 1~i.108 14.14(i 1:3.1:34 l~i.117 l'1.414 9.389 l3.(il0 12.663
N 13 15. l I'? 14.1:3'? 1'3.136 I5.0!)5 1'1.41'L 9.389 1:3.fi23 12.669
('CO 15.121 14.1'l9 13.124 15.078 12.410 9.389 13.594 12.674
' 0)', ~P~, ~P~, OW, ~N in Uío growth per annum. RL and RS in qo and G in
logaritmic of the real level government expenditure values..5 I,MI'IRICAI RI?SIIL7'S 22
during the eighties. '1'hese results aze obtained with, on average, lower levels of government
expenditure and lower levels of the short (and long term) interest rates than during the
period 1981-1990. The results are in accordance with the broad economic policy guidelines
of the EU in which a reduction of short and long term interest rates ia proposed in the ahort
to medium term and budgetary consolidation should be achieved by reducing government
expenditure and by an iinprovement of the efficiency of the fiscal syatem (see, e.g., the
1994 broad economic guidelines [11~).
Studying some results more epecifically we observe that for all countries the cooperative
outcomes show lower inflation rates than the noncooperative outcomes. These outcomes
are generated, on average, by reductions in government expenditure and an increase in the
long term interest rates. As can be seen in table 5, both policies hamper growth in the
SLIM-model. This property suggests that countries should use a higher interest rate policy
in order to prevent in8ationary growth t'.
For Germany we observe that in the cooperative setting it óas to reduce domestic inflation
in order to reduce foreign inflation. Because GDP-growth is strongly inflationary in the
SLIM-model, this policy leads to lower GDP growth rates. Since Germany plays a leading
role due to its large spillovers, we find in the cooperative game that Germany likes to pre-
vent negative effects for other EU-economies, which is ultimately profitable for Germany
itself. Important to note is the accumulation of inflation over time in the SLIM-model. A
relatively high inflationary policy in Germany generates higher inflations abroad. In the
next period this high inflation is transported back to Germany which, in the next period
again, is transported back abroad and so ou. The longer the planning period the more
important this inflationary accumulation effect drivea the final resulta. Remarkable is the
policy change that occurs in Germany if the cooperative setting is replaced by a nonco-
operative one. In the cooperative solution Germany increases the short term interest rate
and uses a contractionary fiscal policy in order to reduce inflation (and, thus, also inflation
abroad) whereas in the noncooperative setting it does not care about the foreign effects
and chooses a contractionary monetary and expansionary fiscal policy. This noncoopera-
tive behaviour leads to more growth in Germany but also to higher domestic and foreign
inflation and lower domestic employment.
To understand most of the results we have to discuss the impact of the two policy instru-
ments in the SLIM-model, the short term interest rate and government expenditure. We
take Germany as an example. An increase in the German short term interest rate leads in
general to an increase in the domestic long term interest rate. This results in a decline in
domestic output, inflation and wages. There is, however, through the channel of the long
term interest rate a stabilising effect, since the decline of inflation leads to lower interest
rates. The irtitial increase in the long term interest rate in Germany has, furthermore, an
r'The eame aseeement was made by the monetary authorities in 1989: in a period of in8ationary prea
eurea, where the rate of growth exceded the level required to stabilize employment, nominal ahort-term
intereat rates increaeed in every EU-country (see Drèze en Malinvaud [9]).5 EMPIRICAG RESULTS 23
increasing effect on the foreign long term interest rates and, hence, a negative effect on
foreign growth. This effect can be valuable for these countries in order to fight against
inllation. On the other hand, a contractionazy fiacal policy in Germany leads also to a
decline in growtó and inftation as well in Germany as in the foreign countriea; but this
decrease in inflation leads, through the interest rate channel, to a decline of the long term
intereat rate in Germany and also abroad. This last effect has again some increasing im-
pact on growtli and inflation. It is exactly this opposite funetioning in policy behaviour
bctween the short term interest rate and government expenditure which should be kept in
mind when interpreting the results.
If we again compare the noiicooperative and cooperative outcomes we see, on average,
that the noucooperative outcomes yicld higher growth rates and to a lesser extent higher
employment ratea but also to higher inflation and wage rates. This effect is mainly cre-
ated by the four largec economie.~s, in particular we see a substantial reduction in the ahort
term interest rate in Germany and the UK and a subatantial expanaionary fiscal policy in
Germany and hrance.
Another iuterc,~sting aspect is that the CCO~-outcome suggests that countries with tradition-
ally low interest rates, such as Germany, Belgiu~n and the Netherlands should adjuat their
interest rates to higher levels in order to achieve global convergence. Our model suggesta
that it is Iess costly for the EU as a whole to reach convergence if these three countriea
adjust t.hcir intcresL rate Icvcls upwards, sincc this would make it ea.vier for the other five
countries, whicL Lave traditiuually higher iuterest rates, to achieve theae lowest three ratea.
The noncooperative outcome, however, suggests that Germany, the Netherlands, and to a
lesser extent Belgium, should follow more the policy they advocated during the eighties
where the interesL rates were, for at least Germany and the Netherlanda, subatantially
lower than for the other five countries. This raises the important question: `who ahould
converge to who?'. It is clear that in a T'reaty with ftxed policy targets this queation would
not exist but in this case, where we have jiexible policy targets, this is a serious isaue. One
could argue that this is one of the reasons why Germany is such an advocate of a more
speed EU, since, in that case, they could follow, more or lesa, their noncooperative strategy
with low interest rates and, hence, leaving the other countries the option to follow or not.
[t is clear that such a noncooperative strategy of Germany saddles up most other countries
with more costs than if a cooperative strategy was adopted by Germany. These increasing
coats in tlie foreign countries are, partly, transferred back to Germany which in the end
yields higher costs for Germany as well in the noncooperative case. This azgument may
also explain why Germany uses this thteat-argument of a two speed Europe in ita negoti-
ations with the other EU-economies. On the other hand, the low gains the model predicts
for the UK, if they play cooperatively, suggests that the UK can put heavy presaure on the
negotiations since they can not gain much during Stage Two. Thia may be an explanation
why it threatens, once in a while, with leaving Llie EU. Remark, that we diaregard the
possible proftts for each country which it expects to gain in Stage Three of EMU tb. Before
~alf the Member Statea would consider the paeaible poaitive gaina of Stage Three, then it ie likely that5 EMPIRICAL RESUL'I'S 24
proceeding with our analyses we firat give the dynamic game results in the tight exchange
rate regime.
5.2 Empirical results in a tight exchange rate regime
We present for this regime the same tables as ahown in the previous subsection. In table
6 we present the implications for welfare for the four game outcomes. The figures can be
Table 6: The objective function values, convergence values and weights in a tight exchange
rate regime
Countries
Belgium Denmark Germ. France Ireland Italy Netherl. U.K.
NC 1.05 1.01 2.96 1.93 1.12 2.34 1.08 1.27
NG'O 0.88 1.15 1.99 1.63 1.18 2.82 0.94 1.27
NB 0.34 0.73 1.19 1.`ll 0.92 1.48 0.72 1.01







Belgium Demnark Germ. France Ireland Italy Netherl. U.K. Conv.
a 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.14 0.20 -
acco 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.19 0.26 0.17 0.44
compared to the outcomes presented in table 4. If in the tight exchange rate regime it
would be optimal that no country uses the possibility of managing its exchange rate with
the dollar, i.e. DE - 0[or the whole planning period, then we would obtain exactly the
same outcomes as in the fixed exchange rate regime which we considered in the previous
subsection.
If we compare the two noncooperative outcomes we see that in a tight exchange rate regime
the NCO outcome is profitable for [our countries (Belgium, Germany, France, the Nether-
lands), malicious for three countries (Denmark, Iteland, Italy) and makes no difference for
the UK. Furthermore, these results suggest a small increase in global welfaze since the total
gains of the four countries seem to be higher than the total losses of the three countries.
Concerning individual welfare in the NCO-solution we noticed that increasing A yielded
substantial gains [or the four mentioned countries and the UK, whereas for the other three
countries we found that the objective function values remained almost the same as shown
in table 6, with ~- 0.'l. Thc implications for total welfare depend, of course, on the
we.ights onc assigna to Lhc iudividual welfarc functions, but with eyual weighta we found
each Member State ia willing to accept more coets during Stage Two. ln our context, this means thst
Member Statee are willing to coneider outcomea outside the negotiation area where even more eonvergence
would be poeeible.5 EMPIftICAL RESUL'fS 25
that total welfare substantially increased when increasing a. These experimenta suggest
that the outcomes severely depend on the specification oí the convergence conditions in a
noncooperativc world and that iL even may be possible that a particular convergence func-
tion could be constructed iu which each individual Member State would be better off than
in the NC-solution. Cornparing tables 5 and 7, we observe that managing the exchange
rate in the SLIM-model is profitable for the five tratlitionally higher inl3ationary countries
but malicious [or I~elgium, Cermany and the Netherlands. This observation holda for any
of the four gatne outcomes.
Remarkable are the differences in welfare outcomes in the noncooperative case for Germany
and France between the tight and the fixed exchange rate regime. A great deal of burden,
associated with the various exc:haugc rate policics in the Light exchange rate regime, is
covered by Ccrmany. 7'his obscrvation follows from the fact that Gcrmany has a substan-
tially lower wclFare value in the fixed exchange rate regime than in the tight exchange rate
regime, whereas for France it is the other way around. The reason for this finding is that
in the SLIM-model, French output is strongly positively affected by au appreciation of the
nominal exchange rate between the French Franc against the Dollar and a depreciation of
the nominal exchange rate between thc German mark againat the Dollaz.
The overall results of table 6 are in line with those of table 4. We observe also that
Lhe weights crNe aud crNC are (vcry) similar in both dynamic game experiments. Again
Gennany, France and ltaly have Lhe lowest weight values in the NL~solution. The four
smaller dependent countries and the more isolated country UK gain less in a cooperative
strategy. [n the cooperative solutions, the fixed exchange rate regime can be seen as a
restricted form of the tight exchange rate regime and should therefore by definition lead
to lower total welfare values. Lf we, as an example, multiply all irrdividual weights with
the corresponding individual welfares then we find that total welfare increases from 0.89
in the tight exchange rate regime to 0.98 in the fixed exchange rate regime. If we use the
same aNB-weights then we find that in the NC, case (and, thus, also in the CCO case)
that total welfare is 1.30 in the tight exchange rate regime and 1.36 in the fixed exchange
rate regime. For the CCO-solution this observation implies that in the tight exchange rate
regime 1.30-0.89-0.41 of total welfare ia used for minimising convergence and in the fixed
exchange rate regime 1.36-0.98-0.38 of total welfare. It is clear that the CCt~solution
chosen in this example dces not guarantee that the convergence criteria are reached. It
is, however, possible to search for strategiPS which satisfy the convergence criteria and a
`rough tneasure' of convergence costs, in terms of welfare, could then be conatructed as
shown by the example above.
In table 7 we present the averages oí the target and instrumental valuea for each country
seperately. A first glance shows that the qualitative outcomes of the fixed exchange rate
regime are sintilar to the tight exchange rate regime. For all countries we see again that
intlatiou is reduced in the cooperative case. We observe the strongest adjustments in the
exchange rates in the CCO outcome. For this outcome, we observe that the traditionally5 LMNIRICAL KESIIL'1'S
Table 7: Thc average target- and instrumental values ( 1992-1999)"
Target valuea
Bel. Germ. Denm. France U.K. Irel.
DY NC 1.86 2.52 1.41 '2.35 2.65 4.64
NCO 1.97 2.58 1.98 2.59 2.68 4.69
NB 1.87 2.47 1.57 2.20 2.56 4.59
(,'CO 1.74 2.20 1.43 1.90 2.52 4.49
OPy NC 3.33 4.11 5.25 5.56 4.92 5.91
NCO 3.54 4.09 5.32 5.76 4.94 5.92
N B 3.08 3.68 4.92 4.52 4.63 5.71
CCO 3.09 3.75 4.76 4.11 4.45 5.54
OPc NC 3.48 3.66 5.39 5.54 4.78 5.03
NCO 3.69 3.65 5.45 5.74 4.81 5.04
NB 2.99 3.36 5.04 4.52 4.48 4.77
CCO 2.96 3.39 4.88 4.12 4.31 4.57
~W NC 5.23 5.37 6.82 7.06 7.50 9.06
NCO 5.54 5.41 6.96 7.39 7.54 9.08
N B 4.79 4.82 6.44 5.81 7.11 8.82
CCO 4.76 4.72 6.18 5.22 6.86 8.61
~N NC 0.03 0.39 0.36 0.38 -0.32 0.70
NCO 0.07 0.43 0.37 0.50 -0.29 0.72
NB 0.04 0.56 0.45 0.30 -0.41 0.66
CCO -0.03 0.46 0.42 0.15 -0.49 0.60
RL NC 8.07 7.07 9.56 10.05 8.72 8.69
NCO 8.11 7.07 8.66 9.28 8.59 8.25
NB 8.46 8.34 9.39 10.09 9.42 8.71
CCO 8.93 8.91 9.50 9.91 9.60 9.33
Inslrumental values
Bel. Germ. Denm. France U.K. Irel.
RS NC 6.84 4.92 8.36 9.36 8.29 8.48
NCO 6.96 4.89 7.27 8.25 8.09 7.78
NB 7.44 7.43 8.38 9.59 9.77 8.49
CCO 8.28 8.67 8.58 9.23 10.13 9.51
G NC 15.091 14.147 13.136 15.119 12.410 9.389
NCO 15.095 14.144 13.135 15.110 12.412 9.389
NB 15.112 14.125 13.136 15.099 12.414 9.389
CCO 15.126 14.128 13.128 15.O86 12.411 9.388
~E NC -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.06
NCO 0.00 U.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.06
NB -0.02 0.13 0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.05
CCO 0.15 0.54 0.00 -0.09 0.01 -0.14
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higher inflationazy countries, auch as France, Ireland and Italy, appreciate their cunency
against the dollar and that the traditionally low inflationary countries, such as Belgium,
Germany and the Netherlands depreciate their currency, in order to fulfil the convergence
requirements (of especially convergence in consumer price inflation).
Now let us take a closer look at the four convergence criteria. Since we have only one fiscal
policy instrument, government expenditure, the experiments are less useful for checking
the budget criteria. We did, however, construct the desired government expenditure paths
such that all Member States substantially reducecl government expenditure in order to be
able to restore their budget. In comparison with the other game outcomes, for most coun-
tries the CCO-outcome yielded lower levels of government expenditure. This was not the
ca.9e for [3elgium and the Netherlands. Comparircg the noncooperative and the cooperative
outcomes we see that both countries changed their policy behaviour in both experiments.
In the noncooperative game they follow a contractionazy fiscal policy and a low interest
rate policy. However, in especially the CCO-case, they have to follow the higher interest
rates of the other countries and, therefore, both countries óave to increase interest tates.
This policy has, however, a negative impact on output growth and in order to offset some
of this negative impact both countries react with an increase in government expenditure.
Through the high priority oi 10 on the exchange ratey we obviously find that the exchange
rates are kept very tight arocmd the 1991 values. In table 7 one observes that most values
of DE are close to zero; we only find a substantial depreciation of the German mark against
the Dollar in the case of the CCO-outcome. It is clear that such a policy is very unlikely
in reality. However, in the cooperatíve CCD-outcome studied here, Germany is very much
concerned about convergence of all the EtJ-Member States and, therefore, reacts with a
depreciation policy.
In order to check the two central criteria of convcrgence in conaumer price inflation and
nominal loug t.erm interest rates wc will present sorne graphs. In figure 5, we present the
consumer price dc(fator responses for Lhree different game outcomes in the tight exchange
rate regime'a. In figure 6 we present the long terrn interest rates for the same game out-
comes. '1'he graphs show some interestiug facts. First of all, the graphs suggest that it
seems to bc rnuch harder to couverge. for consunier pricc inflation than for the long term
iuterest rates. This [act is, óowevar, rnore a property of the model and is related to the fact
that long term interest rates in the SI,IM-model can directly be manipulated by the ahort
term interest rates, whcreas the cousumer price deflator can only indirectly be influenced
'r. As already indicated by the convergence valuc~s of table 6, we see in all figures that the
degree of convergence increases from the NC, Nl3 to the CCO-outcome. The long term
interest rate criterion is fulfilled by all the Member States in the CCO-outcome with an av-
erage long term interest of 8.5cI'o. For the consumer price deflator we find less convergence.
'aThe similarity between the grapha of the NC and NCO outcome was large, so we decided to include
the graph of the NC outcome ouly
17For instauce, i( we would lollow thc same atrategy ns uard in Brandsa and Italianer [3], who coneider
wages as an instrumental variable, then it would be much easier to obtain convergence in (lower) conaumer
price inflation ratea.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
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Figure 5: Consumer price inflation responses in vazious game outcomes5 EMYIRICAL ItESUL'1:S 2g
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Figure 6: Long term interest rate responses in various game outcomes6 CONCLUSIDNS 30
If we consider the three Member States with the lowest inflation (Belgium, Germany and
the Netherlands), then we find a consumer price deflator of around 4elo. Since, the Maas-
tricht Treaty allows only for conaumer price inflation ratea which aze no more than 1.510
pointa above the average for the three countries with the loweat inflation ratea we see that
three of the other five Member Statea fulfil thia rule and that Italy and France come very
cloae to the 5.5~6 norm. The results of the graphs are in accordance with the empirical
results of Brandama and Italianer [3] who state that, with appropriate coordination, all
the eight Member State ahould be able to fulfil the convergence criteria. In that atudy the
authora used the European Commiasion's Quest model, which contains all the EU-Member
States and they allowed sometimea, in order to fulfil the criteria, for drastic measurea such
as dismiasing government employeea or using the wage rate of the government employees as
a policy variable. R,emazk, however, that in that reaearch the broad economic policy guide-
linea [ll] were followed which propose inflation rates of 2-30l0. It ia important to atress that
these inflation rates aze low if one compazea them with the average inflation ratea during
the eightiea. Therefore, it is important to realiae that during the 1990-1994 period average
output was rather low in the EU, so that several countries fighted succesafully against infla-
tion. A property of the SLIM-model, and alao of most other EU-models (aee, e.g. Douven
and Plasmana [6]), ia that growth ia strongly inflationary (in the long run on average lq
GDP-growth yielda about 2~o inflation). Thie relationship between growth and inflation in
moat models may be somewhat exaggerated, but also may suggest that countriea will get
a hazd time if overall growth in the EU substantially increases. Concerning employment,
tablea 5 and 7 suggest also that in order to reach the convergence criteria employment will
decline in most countries, except for Denmark and Germany. For these two countries the
decline in wages, which stimulatea employment, was large enough to offset the decrease
in output, which hampers employment. In all experiments the impact on employment
ia rather low which suggeata that the policy measures uaed in the SLIM-model are not
adequate enough to fight for aubstantial increases in employment. It suggests that more
atructural changes are needed in order to promote employment in several EU-economiea.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we carried out a dynamic game analysis with the SLIM-model. In thedynamic
game we compare four (hypothetical) scenarios. First, a noncooperative scenario which is
represented by the feedback Nash solution (NC) in which each country minimises its own
welfare and, aecond, a feedback Nash solution (NCO) in which each country minimises its
own welfaze, but additionally tries to fulfil the two convergence criteria of convergence in
the long term interest rates and convergence in conaumer price inflation rates. Third, a
purely cooperative scenario, which is represented by the Nash bargaining aolution (NB)
and, fourth, a c:ooperative convergence scenario (CCO). In thia last scenario the EU-
Member States play in a cooperative mode, but face a dynamic constraint of convergence
in conaumer price inflation and long term interest rates. These two convergence conditions6 CONCLUSIONS 31
are elaborated at the Maastricht Treaty (1991). The third condition in this Treaty is that
each Member State should strive for a sustainable government financial position. This
aspect is modelled by means of the individual welfare functiona of each country. In our
experiments we assumed thaL eac;h country substantially lowers its government expenditure
increases, in ordet to restore its government deficit. The fourth Maastricht convergence
condition, uo exchange rate realignments for at least two years, is modelled by keeping in
one experitnent the (dollar) exchange rate fixed at the initial 1991 levels and in a second
experiment by allowing only for very amall movements azound these 1991 levels. For the
CCO-solution we assume that countries do not accept `welfaze losses' which are higher
than the `welfare costs' obtained in the noncooperative solution. This assumption makes
it possible to prove that the maxirnum convergence that can be reached is limited. Fur-
thermom, one can obtain a uniyue cooperative couvergence solution in this case.
The first important observation is that we found some evidence that convergence doea not
occur if the EiJ-Member Statcs do not coordinate their policies (see also Brandsma and
Italianer [3]).
Furthermore, our theoretical study suggests that one should deaign (optimal) convergence
criteria in the sense that Lhe impact of the convergence criteria is profitable in the nonco-
operative case and remains close to Pareto optimal solutions in the cocrperative case. Since,
in reality, we observe a mix of cooperative and noncooperative policy behaviour this atudy
auggests that the European Commission should strive for restrictiona on national policiea
in which negative spillovers diminish in the noncooperative game but still keep almost all
the gains in the cooperative game. Our first empirical results give some evidence to the
fact that the Maastricht criteria at least do not lrarrn much in a noncooperative setting
and are indeed close to Pareto optirnal solutions in the cooperative setting.
The model `predicts' a nominal long term interest rate of around 8.5qo and a consumer
price deftator of around 40~o as optirnal in 1999. Optimal growth will in all countriea be
moderate.
Country specific rernarks are that the SLIM-model predicts that the two lazgest EU-
Member Statc.~s, Germany and Frauce gain most wheu cornparing the noncooperative out-
conre with the purely cooperative outcome. `1'his give.~s some evidence to the fact that strong
(more independent) countries gain more, by playing cooperatively, than small (more de-
pendent) countries. The main intuition behind Lhis result is that the gains of the strongly
interdependent countries are mainly due to a more effective use of their inatrumental vari-
ables in order to produce, more or less, the same target variables, whereas the generated
spillovers to the dependent countries are only produced by the target variables.
The two convergence conditions of the long term interest rate and the consumer price in-
flation are examples of flexible sliared targets, since it is beforehand not clear what the
ideal target values in 1999 will be. This raises an important question: Who converges to
who? Should countriea strive for the low targets advocated by Germany or ahould Ger-
many adjust its interest rate, and inflation targets to higher valuea and, thus, giving the
other couul.ries more room (and, hence, less welfare loss) for achieving the criteria. Our
rnodel predicts that it would be less costly for the EU as a whole if the traditionally lowA APPI;NDIX 32
interest rate countric~ Belgium, Germany and the Netherlanda converge towards the óigher
intereat ratea of the five other EU-economies, instead of using as convergence tazget a fixed
low nominal interest rate level. InHation targets can, more or less, be fixed on the initial
1991 values of aroutid 'l-4Qlo. We have to ernphasize that this result óinges decisively on
the assumption that all countries (including Italy) ahould converge. Excluding, e.g., an
inHationary country like Italy from a cooperative dynamic game experiment would lead to
lower in9ation tazget rates for the other players in that game.
It is important to strosa Lhat the results obtained in this paper are, of course, model depen-
deut. Further research, such as robustness and sensitivity analyses, is deairable in order to
obtain a better understanding of the different game outcomes. In particular the following
aspects ahould be elaborated:
(1) In our research we assumed exogenous behaviour of the two foreign countries, USA and
Japan. How will the dynamic game outcomes change if we endogenise their behaviour?
(2) Since it ia extremely difficult to model the exact specifications of the convergence con-
ditions of the Maastriclit Treaty we modelled convergence in this paper by assuming that
the EU-Member States converge to the average long term interest rate level and average
consumer price inflation of the larger three EU-Member Statea, Germany, France and U.K.
This aspect of the modcl should be elaborated more and it may be interesting to look for
`optimal' convergence functiwis.
A Appendix
In this appendix we gíve derive the formula for computing cooperative convergence out-
comea (CCO). To that end the convergence problem is rewritten into a atandard optimal
control problem. First, however, we will formulate the description of the dynamic behaviour
of each country in the SLIM-model:
Asaumption A.1 The economèc óehaviour oj the individual countries can be described 6y
(jori - 1,...,N) :
N
y;(t) - A;y;(t - 1) ~~ A;;y;(t - 1) -}- B;u;(t) f D;d;(t) (7)
i~i
where y;(t) E!i"' is the slate oj the i-th country (endogenous variablesJ, u;(t) E IR'"' is the
control vector (instrumental variables) and the vector d;(t) E IR~' is the purely exogenous
data-vector. For all i, A;, A;~, B; and D; are real matrices of appropriate dimensions.
Asaumption A.2 Even~ country solves the problem:
min J~ -- w~n ~{ ~~y;(t) - y. (t)~~4;(e) t ~~u;(t) - u:(t)~~R:(e)}A APPENDIX 33
aubject to (7).
Using the stacked forms u(t) - (u~(t),...,uN(t))' and y(t) -(yl(t),...,y'N(t))' the aspect of
convergence can be described as follows:
Assumption A.3 The minimisation problem vrith respect to the convergence function is
defined as:
e~
minC(u) :- min ~ ~~L(t)y(t)~~Qo~i~
~-w
Remark. The matrices L(t),Qo(t) can be chosen dependent on the problem. For
instance if we want to investigate convergence to the average of the endogenoua variables,






or if we want to inveatigate wnvergence to endogenoua variablea of a specific country, say
country i, we get
r ! 0 ... 0 I 0... 0
I 0 -I 0... I 0... 0
L -
. . I .
0 . . 0 0 0... 0
. 1 . .
0 . . . I . . -1 ~
The matrices (~o(t) give the weights that each country wants to assign to the convergence
function in each time period. Remark, that in the paper we choose L such that it satiafies
the convergence function as presented in the paper.A APPCNDIX 34
Asaumption A.4 (cooperative convergence problem) Given
N
OCniGI, t-l,...,N, ~ni-1, OG.~G], - - i-i -
the pmblem to be solved is:
mm
u,
subject to (?) for (i-1,...,N).
A -
The aolution of the above atated control problem can be derived by reformulating it as a
atandard LQ probleln. We first introduce the overall aystem vectors:
y(t) - (yl(t),ys(t),...,TJN(t))~
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The above problem is equivalent with the optimal control problem:
min~ {II~(t) - y'(t)II~~~~ f Ilu(t) -u'(t)Ilitt~~}
~-b
SUh)QCt t0
y(t) - Ay(t - 1) f Bu(t) f Dd(t),
with




Q(t) - r Q(t) 0
1 ` o Q~(t)
R(t) - R(t)
y(t) - ( y(t) 1
`y(t) J
u(t) - ~ u(t) )
Y'(t) - I y,Ót) ~
u'(t) - l` u'(t) ~
d(t) - ~ d(t) ~
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Theorem A.5 TAe solutiou Jor lhe cooperalive canvergcnce proble~n is then give.n, for
t - to,...,t~, b~ :
u(t) - E(t t 1)-' (R(t)ie'(t) - 2BTK (t ~ 1) ~fly(t - 1) .} Dd(t)~ - 2BTg(t f 1))
where K(t) satisfies, jor t - t~,...,t~ ~ 1, the jollowing óackward Riccati difference equa-
lion :
J K(t) - 2Q(t - l) f ÁTK(t ~- 1) ~I - zBE-'(t f 1)BTK(t f 1)~ Á
l K(t~ f 1) - 2Q(t~)I3 API'IsNDIX 3g
F.(l f l) ix deJined, Jor t - t~, .. ., t~, by :
E(t -}. 1) :- R(t) f 2BTK(t t 1)B
g(t) satisfiea, for t- t~, ..., t~ t 1, the follouring backward difference equation :
g(t) --2Q(t - 1)y'(t - 1) i- ÁTK (t f 1)BE''(t t 1)R(t)n'(t)
fÁTK(t f 1)Dd(t) - zÁK (t f 1)BE''(i f 1)BTK(t ~-1)Dd(t)
fÁTg(t t 1) - zAK(t f 1)BE-'(t f 1)BTg(t f 1)
g(tJ f 1) - -2Q(t!)y~(tJ)
Remazk, that the atandazd cooperative problem, without convergence, can be computed
by aubstituting L - 0.
The CCO solution is now represented by a pazticulaz choice of the weighta oeco -
(a~,...,aN,a). To find this set we have to uae a conatraint optimiaation procedure. Theae
procedures are available in exiating computer packages. Since, in section 3.3 it is shown
that the CCO outcome coincides in the J~, ..., JN-plane with the NC outcome, the stop-
ping criterium of the numerical optimization algorithm can be implemented as follows.
Stop, if for all i, i- 1, ..., N, J; is `close' to Jl"c
B Appendix
In this appendix we describe our choices for the exogenous valuea. For the two foreign
countriea, USA and Japan, we used as stazting values, the true 1991 values. From thereon
we conatructed the exogenoua values for 1992-1999, uaing lineaz ínterpolation. Since, links
between countries in the SLIM-model aze of three types: first, financial variables such as
interest rates and exchange rates; second, GDP inflation; and third foreign output, we
preaent in table 8 just the (growth) rates for these values. Remark, that we assumed that
the nominal long term intereat rate, RL, is constant for the planning period 1992-1999. For
Table 8: The exogenous (growth) rates for USA and Japan in 1999.
rates jor endogenous valuea
CountrYes ~Y ~Py RL
IJSA 2.00 3.00 8.00
Japan 3.00 2.00 6.00
the other cxogenous variables in the model, the nominal exchange rate and the labour force
we constructed the exogenous paths as follows. We used the actual 1991 values and from
thereon we assumed for the labour force the average historical growth rates over the laat
ten yeara 1982-1991 and for the nominal exchange rates we asaumed zero growth rates.REFERENCES
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